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Most industrialized countries entered the 1980s with their public ﬁnances in disarray. At
the time, persistent deﬁcits pushed up public debt-to-GDPratios. Despite such simi-
larities, deﬁcit spending varies substantially between countries and within countries over
time. Recent theoretical and empirical research has considered how diﬀerences in political
arrangements aﬀecting national policy formation might explain variation in ﬁscal policies
pursued. Using a panel of 22 OECD countries over the 1971-1996 period this paper ex-
tends previous literature on the eﬀects of fragmented government on ﬁscal policy outcomes
in various directions. First, we focus on data relating to central government instead of
general government as all theories refer to central government. Second, not only do we
analyze the eﬀect of size fragmentation of government, we also examine government’s
position vis-` a-vis parliament and government’s political fragmentation. We ﬁnd evidence
that more fragmented government (deﬁned in terms of the number of political parties in
a coalition or the number of spending ministers) have higher deﬁcits. There is also some
evidence that governments that dispose of excess seats in parliament have lower deﬁcits.
Right-wing governments appear to have been ﬁscally more responsible in the seventies.
Political fragmentation does not aﬀect government’s budget deﬁcit.
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11 Introduction
Most industrialized countries entered the 1980s with their public ﬁnances in disarray. At
the time, persistent deﬁcits pushed up public debt-to-GDPratios. Despite such similarities,
deﬁcit spending varies substantially between countries and within countries over time. Recent
theoretical and empirical research has considered how diﬀerences in political arrangements
aﬀecting national policy formation might explain variation in ﬁscal policies pursued. In this
research the assumption of an inﬁnite horizon, benevolent government, which is standard in
many macroeconomic analyses, is dropped.
One line of empirical research focuses on so-called fragmented government. This research
started with Roubini & Sachs (1989a,b) who used a variable to identify the type of government
in power to explain the growth of government debt in OECD countries. They found that
broad coalition governments experienced higher deﬁcits, other things being equal, than did
one-party, majoritarian governments. Similar results were reported by Corsetti & Roubini
(1992). However, subsequent research found less support for the Roubini-Sachs view.1
Recently, Kontopoulos and Perotti have broadened this approach by arguing that the
previous literature overlooked what they call size fragmentation (see Kontopoulos & Perotti
(1999) and Perotti & Kontopoulos (1999)). One possible source of fragmentation of ﬁscal
policy-making is the number of decision makers. The larger the number of decision makers
the less each will internalize the costs that a certain policy will impose on others. It can be
argued that the relevant group here is each political party in government. The rationale is that
for the purpose of ﬁscal policy-making a party is more or less a cohesive entity, representing
the interests of speciﬁc groups. An alternative interpretation would be that each spending
minister in the government is the basic unit, as each participates in the formulation of the
overall budget and makes demands on it.
Using a dataset for 19 OECD countries over the period 1970-95, Perotti & Kontopoulos
(1999) conclude that the number of spending ministers and, to a lesser extent, also the
number of political parties in a coalition aﬀect ﬁscal policy outcomes. Ideology also matters
for spending, notably so for transfers, but does not aﬀect deﬁcits. The authors also conclude
1Edin & Ohlsson (1991) argue, for instance, that the political cohesion variable used by Roubini and Sachs
captures the eﬀects of minority governments rather than majority coalition governments. De Haan & Sturm
(1994) and De Haan & Sturm (1997) found support for neither the Roubini-Sachs hypothesis nor the position
expressed by Edin-Ohlsson. Borelli & Royed (1995), Hahm, Kamlet, & Mowery (1996), Kontopoulos & Perotti
(1999), De Haan, Sturm, & Beekhuis (1999) and Perotti & Kontopoulos (1999) also dismiss the Roubini-
Sachs hypothesis. Recently Ashworth & Heyndels (2000) have found some evidence that weak (fragmented)
governments respond slower to external shocks to the tax structure.
2that the importance of size fragmentation increases in diﬃcult times (i.e. periods with high
unemployment and/or high debt ratios). Also De Haan, Sturm, & Beekhuis (1999) and
Franzese (1998) report (weak) evidence that the number of parties in a coalition matters for
ﬁscal policy outcomes.
This paper extends the literature in a number of ways. One serious shortcoming of most
previous empirical work in this line of research is that the data used refer to general gov-
ernment, whereas the theoretical notions that underly the estimates clearly refer to central
government. In many countries ﬁscal variables of central and local governments diverge sub-
stantially. In this paper we use data for central government. Furthermore, we extend previous
research in three other directions. First, we examine other aspects of fragmentation, including
political fragmentation as the ideological coherence of a cabinet may matter for ﬁscal pol-
icy outcomes as well (see also Franzese (1998)). Second, we examine government’s position
vis-` a-vis parliament as this may also aﬀect ﬁscal policy outcomes. Finally, we oﬀer a careful
sensitivity analysis to check for the robustness of our ﬁndings.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the model
and data employed. Section 3 presents the outcomes of the basic model, while Section 4
contains sensitivity analyses. The ﬁnal section oﬀers some concluding comments.
2 The model and data
We use a variant of the model of Roubini and Sachs (1989a,b) that has also been employed
by various subsequent studies. It is consistent both with elements of optimizing approaches
to budget deﬁcits (such as the tax smoothing model of Barro (1979)) and with traditional
Keynesian models of ﬁscal deﬁcits. Indeed, both theories imply that budget deﬁcits are
countercyclical. Suppressing time indices the estimated equation is:
DEF = a0 + a1DEFL + a2GROWTH + a3DRB + a4POL + v (1)
where the dependent variable (DEF) denotes the budget deﬁcit-to-GDPratio of central gov-
ernment. The explanatory variables are: the lagged deﬁcit (DEFL)2, the real GDPgrowth
rate (GROWTH), the change in actual debt-servicing costs (DRB), and the various political-
institutional variables (POL) deﬁned below; v denotes the error term.3 Country dummies are
2Kontopoulos & Perotti (1999) employ the change of the deﬁcit as dependent variable, thereby imposing the
restriction that a1 = 1. In our model without political variables this restriction had to be rejected (t =1 0 .1).
It also turned out that our outcomes were quite diﬀerent for this speciﬁcation.
3We have also experimented with other explanatory variables as suggested in the literature. Perotti &
Kontopoulos (1999) include, for instance, also the inﬂation rate. It turned out that this variable was generally
3included in all regressions.
The ﬁscal data for central government are from various issues of the IMF’s Government
Finance Statistics (GFS). Our sample comprises of 22 OECD countries (all except Luxem-
bourg) and starts for most countries between 1971 and 1973, which is the earliest observation
in the GFS, and generally ends in 1995 or 1996.4 As the GFS also provide information on
total outlays (OUTL) and total incomes (INC), our dataset allows us to examine whether the
eﬀect of any political variable on the deﬁcit exerts its inﬂuence through the revenue and/or
the expenditure side of the budget. As there are sometimes data breaks, we have constructed
a dummy variable for all observations for which GFS indicated a break. This dummy is
included as an additional explanatory variable.
We focus on four groups of political variables. First, we examine the impact of size frag-
mentation of government. Second, we analyse the position of government vis-` a-vis parliament.
Third, we examine the impact of the ideological complexion of government. Finally, we fo-
cus on the political fragmentation of government, i.e. the degree to which political parties
in the coalition have diﬀerent ideologies. The most important source for our political data
is Woldendorp, Keman, & Budge (1993) and the update thereof (Woldendorp, Keman, &
Budge (1998)). For some countries and variables other sources have been used (see the data
appendix for further details).
As pointed out in the Introduction, the concept of size fragmentation can be interpreted in
two ways. First, it can refer to the number of political parties in government. As the number
of parties does not take the size of the various parties into account, we have employed the







where pi denotes denotes the share of ministers from party i as a proportion to the total
number of ministers and n is the number of coalition parties. This concept is the inverse
of the Herﬁndahl-index (see, e.g., Martin (1993, p. 165), and has already been applied in
political economy studies (see, for instance, Taagepera & Shugart (1989)).
Second, size fragmentation may refer to the number of spending ministers (NSM). This
variable is deﬁned somewhat diﬀerently from Perotti & Kontopoulos (1999). Their deﬁnition
insigniﬁcant. Furthermore, the rate of inﬂation is already implicitly taken into account by including real interest
payments into the model. We have also employed the (change in the) unemployment rate as additional variable.
Once the growth rate of GDP is included this variable was often insigniﬁcant. This is caused by the high degree
of correlation between the rate of growth of real GDP and the change in the unemployment rate (-0.5).
4The data set used can be downloaded at http://www.eco.rug.nl/medewerk/bjorn/papers.html,t h em o s t
recent version of the paper can also be found there.
4of spending ministers is not entirely satisfactory as it also includes head(s) of the ministry(ies)
of ﬁnance. In the literature on budgetary procedures these ministries are generally considered
to be not spending departments but instead those taking the public interest into account.5
It is widely believed that the minister of ﬁnance, like the prime minister, has a somewhat
diﬀerent position than other ministers. Our measure NSM is therefore simply the total number
of ministers in government as reported by Woldendorp, Keman, & Budge (1993) minus the
ministers of ﬁnance and/or the budget and the prime minister.
Now let’s turn to government’s position vis-` a-vis parliament. The inﬂuence of one coalition
party will be stronger, if the support of the party concerned is needed to gather enough
support in parliament. Or, in other words, if the coalition controls substantially more seats
in parliament than needed for a simple majority, the power of any partner in the coalition
– be it a party or a single MP– will be weaker. To capture this notion we have calculated
the excess number of seats (ES), i.e. the number of seats above those needed for a simple
majority, scaled to the number of seats that make up this simple majority.
A somewhat diﬀerent perspective is provided by our variable ENPP, that measures the
eﬀective number of parties in parliament. The intuition behind this measure is that the
strength of government vis-` a-vis parliament depends on the number of parties in parliament.
The more parties government faces, the more diﬃcult it will be for the opposition to form a
united front against government. Another line of reasoning is, however, also possible. After
all, if a government consists of many parties it is likely that this is a reﬂection of the situation
in parliament.
From this perspective, the ideological fragmentation of parliament may also be relevant.
The more politically divided parliament is, the less government may have to fear from the op-
position. Therefore, we have also calculated the political fragmentation (in line with Franzese






















5Alesina & Perotti (1999, p. 23) state, for instance, that: “The constituencies of spending ministers are
groups and industries who beneﬁt from certain spending programs, while, at least in theory, the constituency of
the Treasury minister is the “average” taxpayer. Thus the spending ministers do not internalize the aggregate
costs of certain spending programs, while the Treasury has an incentive to internalize.”
5ICPis constructed as follows. Using various sources, all n political parties in parliament
are positioned on a one (left-wing) to ten (right-wing) scale. ICPis then constructed using
the total number of seats of party i as weighting factors. Thus, (4) can be interpreted as the
average complexion of parliament, whereas (3) can be interpreted as its variance.
Finally, we have included some indicators for political fragmentation of government. Fol-
lowing Franzese (1998) we employ two variables. The ﬁrst one (PFRAG) simply measures












where ICG measures the ideological complexion of government, based on the relative number










The second measure is inspired by Tsebelis’s (1995) argument that each member of a
coalition may be a potential veto-actor. Large ideological diﬀerences will in that case make
compromising more diﬃcult. To capture this eﬀect, we calculate the maximum distance
between party codes (MDPC) in a coalition.6
As far as the impact of the political complexion of government is concerned, some authors
have argued that as left-wing parties would like to spend more they are also likely to have
higher deﬁcits. However, there is not much empirical support for this view. For instance,
for the European Union countries, De Haan & Sturm (1994) conclude that the ideology
of government does not aﬀect budget deﬁcits. The indicator used (CPG: complexion of
government) comes from Woldendorp, Keman, & Budge (1993), and ranges from 1 (right-
wing) to 5 (left-wing).
Table 1 summarizes our political variables. The Appendix provides a detailed description
of all political data used and their sources.
3 Results for the basic model
Estimation is by weighted least squares (WLS), correcting for the unbalanced data set. We
have ﬁrst tested whether country-dummies should be included. Indeed, the restriction that
6Although the latter two concepts are rather alike, there is a ﬁne distinction between the two. If MDPC has
a signiﬁcant impact on deﬁcit spending, the main impact of fragmentation of government is exerted through
plain conﬂict of interest within government, whereas a signiﬁcant eﬀect on deﬁcit spending of PFRAG takes
into account the weight of the parties in determining the size of the conﬂict.
6Table 1: Political Variables
Variable: Description: Exp. impact
on deﬁcit:
Average: St. dev.: Max: Min:
ENPG eﬀective number of
parties in govern-
ment
positive 1.78 0.98 5.24 1
NSM number of spending
ministries
positive 15.37 4.70 33 5
ES excess seats of coali-
tion in parliament
negative 0.06 0.11 0.39 −0.39
ENPP eﬀective number of
parties in parliament
? 3.44 1.39 8.27 1.69
PFRAP political fragmenta-
tion of parliament
negative 2.89 1.25 6.87 0.62
PFRAG political fragmenta-
tion of government




positive 1.16 1.33 4.86 0
CPG ideology of govern-
ment
? 2.45 1.55 5 1
Partial correlation coeﬃcients
ENPG NSM ES ENPP PFRAP PFRAG MDPC CPG
ENPG 1 −0.30 0.49 0.82 0.02 0.70 0.85 −0.20
NSM 1 −0.21 −0.28 0.20 −0.39 −0.34 −0.03
ES 1 0.17 −0.16 0.46 0.49 −0.16
ENPP 1 0.16 0.54 0.64 0
PFRAP 1 −0.12 −0.03 −0.02
PFRAG 1 0.87 −0.07
MDPC 1 −0.15
CPG 1
the country dummies were equal could be rejected. In the tables below we only report the
outcomes for the central government budget deﬁcit (DEF) and expenditure (OUTL) as the
diﬀerence between outlays and revenues equals the budget deﬁcit. This requires that we
employ the same model for the budget deﬁcit, expenditures and revenues.
First, we turn to the models for size fragmentation (Table 2). It follows that the eﬀective
number of parties aﬀect the budget deﬁcit of central government (column 1).7 This is due to
the fact that the impact of ENPG on outlays (column 2) is stronger than that on revenues.
7Unless otherwise stated, signiﬁcant indicates signiﬁcance at a 5% level.
7Also the number of spending ministers aﬀects the budget outcome (column 3). Again the
impact of NSM on the expenditure side is stronger than its eﬀect on the revenue side (column
4). The ﬁfth and sixth columns show the results when both ENPG and NSM are included.
Now ENPG is not signiﬁcant in the regression for the government deﬁcit, but both variables
are signiﬁcant in the regression for expenditures. The ﬁnal columns present the results if we
interact our indicators with economic growth; the coeﬃcients of both ENPG and NSM become
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero again in the regression for central government’s deﬁcit, albeit
that this holds true only at the 10 percent level for ENPG (column 7). These results are
broadly in line with the ﬁndings of Kontopoulos & Perotti (1999), who – in contrast to the
present paper – employed data referring to general government.
Table 3 reports the outcomes of the models for the eﬀect of government’s position vis-
` a-vis parliament. All variables that we have constructed have the expected sign, but they
are not all signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We start with the number of excess seats that
government disposes of in parliament (ES). As follows from column 1, a comfortable position
in terms of parliamentary support makes it easier for government to keep its ﬁnances in
order. Interestingly, the eﬀect of this variable is not signiﬁcant in either the expenditure
regression (column 2) nor the revenue regression. The eﬀective number of parties in parliament
(ENPP) also aﬀects the budget deﬁcit (column 3). The more fragmented parliament is, the
higher central government’s budget deﬁcit.8 This eﬀect is caused by a stronger impact on the
expenditure side (column 4) than on the revenue side. The relevance of distinguishing between
various sides of the budget is further illustrated by the political fragmentation of parliament
(PFRAP) that does not aﬀect the budget deﬁcit (column 5), because its impact on revenues
and expenditure (column 6) balance out. If the three variables under this heading are included
simultaneously, only ENPP remains signiﬁcant in the regression for the budget deﬁcit (column
7). If the variables are interacted with economic growth, ES becomes signiﬁcant again (column
9).
Table 4 shows the results for political fragmentation and the ideology of government. We
start with the political fragmentation of government (PFRAG). It is quite interesting that
the coeﬃcient of this variable is neither signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the regression
for government’s budget deﬁcit (column 1) nor government expenditure (column 2). These
ﬁndings contrast with those of Franzese (1998). Our other indicator for ideological diﬀerences
within government (MDPC) yields similar ﬁndings. The regressions with the interaction


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11variables show that both interaction terms are signiﬁcant and MDPC is also signiﬁcant, albeit
at a 10% level. In the regression for expenditures, only MDPC (10%) and its interaction term
are signiﬁcant.
The ﬁnal columns of Table 4 show the results for the ideology of government (CPG).9
Our regressions suggest that left-wing governments do not to have higher deﬁcits than right-
wing governments. If the variable interacted with growth is added, both are insigniﬁcant.
Interestingly, in both the regressions for outlays and revenues the coeﬃcient is positive and
signiﬁcant, independently of the inclusion of the interaction term. This indicates that even
though left-wing governments spend more, they also tax more, so the balance is not aﬀected.
Finally, we have included all political variables in one regression. The results for the full
sample (excluding CPG, n = 469, t-statistics are shown in brackets) are:
DEF = 0.66 DEFL – 0.21 GROWTH + 1.23 DRB + 0.004 ENPG
(20.98) (–5.31) (6.88) (1.48)
+ 0.001 NSM – 0.031 ES + 0.001 ENPP – 0.000 PFRAP
(2.27) (–2.34) (0.31) (–0.37)
+ 0.002 PFRAG – 0.002 MDPC
(0.68) (–0.69) R2 =0 .79.
The results for the smaller sample (including CPG, n = 393, t-statistics are shown in brackets)
are:
DEF = 0.67 DEFL – 0.22 GROWTH + 1.45 DRB + 0.004 ENPG
(19.48) (–5.64) (6.45) (1.21)
+ 0.001 NSM – 0.028 ES + 0.001 ENPP – 0.001 PFRAP
(2.61) (–2.03) (0.55) (–0.47)
+ 0.001 PFRAG – 0.001 MDPC + 0.000 CPG
(0.26) (–0.72) (0.40) R2 =0 .81.
In the regression for the budget deﬁcit, only the number of spending ministers, and the
percentage of excess seats in parliament exert a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the expected sign. The
eﬀect of NSM is caused by the stronger eﬀect on expenditures, whereas ES mainly inﬂuences
revenues (not shown).
4 Sensitivity analyses
In this section we report the outcomes of various sensitivity tests. Kontopoulos & Perotti
(1999) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of fragmentation diﬀers across sample periods. Political and insti-
tutional variables have very little eﬀect in the 1960s. In the seventies they ﬁnd that NSM is
highly signiﬁcant in both the deﬁcit and expenditure regressions, while ENPG is not. In the
9Note that the sample is reduced for these estimates since the variable CPG is not available for Greece,
Portugal, Spain and the United States.
121980s exactly the opposite is true.10 Kontopoulos and Perotti argue that this diﬀerence is
due to the nature of the ﬁscal shocks in the two decades. Whereas in the seventies the main
shock to ﬁscal policy was external, in the eighties it was internal, and the dividing line was
between countries that engaged in discretionary consolidations and those that did not. Table
5 reports the coeﬃcients for the political variables for two subperiods (1971-83 and 1984-96)
if we include the various groups of political variables. For the 1970s we ﬁnd like, Kontopoulos
and Perotti, that only NSM is signiﬁcant in the regression for government’s budget deﬁcit. In
contrast to their results, we ﬁnd that during the 1980/90s the coeﬃcients of both NSM and
ENPG are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (column 1), albeit only at a 10% level. For the
expenditure side of the budget, it appears that NSM is very signiﬁcant in both subperiods,
while ENPG is only signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst (column 2). Again, these results diﬀer from those
of Kontopoulos and Perotti.
As pointed out before, the main diﬀerence in this respect between the studies of Kon-
topoulos and Perotti and ours is the data used. So, the use of data referring to general
government have driven the conclusions of Kontopoulos and Perotti to a certain extent.
Columns (3) and (4) report the results for our variables reﬂecting government’s position
vis-` a-vis parliament. Again, the results are not very stable across both periods. The results
for the 1970s are in line with the results reported in Table 3, albeit that ES is less signiﬁcant.
During the 1980s none of the variables exerts a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the government’s
budget deﬁcit. For the expenditure side, the results for the 1980s are broadly in line with
those for the full sample period, but during the 1970s only the eﬀective number of parties in
parliament matters.
Columns (5) and (6) show the outcomes for ideological diﬀerences inside government.
Here the results for the subsamples are in line with those for the full sample. Columns (9)
and (10) contain the regression results for government’s ideology. Interestingly, government
ideology seems to have mattered in the seventies. More left-wing governments had higher
deﬁcits. This eﬀect has vanished in the eighties.
Columns (7) and (8) (full sample, no CPG) and (11) and (12) (smaller sample, CPG
included) show the results if all politico-institutional variables are included. It follows that
during the 1970s the main inﬂuence on the budget deﬁcit was both the number of spending
ministers and the share of excess seats in parliament (only in the smaller sample), whereas
none of the variables has had a signiﬁcant impact on the budget deﬁcit in the 1980s sample.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14Next, we have examined the sensitivity of our results for the sample of countries. We
have re-estimated all models 22 times, excluding one country every time. It appeared that
some of the results are sensitive for the inclusion of a speciﬁc country. The coeﬃcient for
ES is only signiﬁcant at a 10% level if Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden or the United
Kingdom is not included in the sample. If the United States are excluded, the coeﬃcient for
the percentage of excess seats in parliament becomes highly insigniﬁcant. All these countries
have been governed by a minority government at one or more instances.11 Furthermore,
the coeﬃcient for ENPG becomes insigniﬁcant if Sweden is excluded from the sample. On
the other hand, if either France (10%), New Zealand (10%), or the United States (5%) are
excluded from the sample, the coeﬃcient for PFRAP becomes signiﬁcant. If all variables
are included, NSM becomes less signiﬁcant (10%) if France is excluded, and ES is either not
signiﬁcant (if Sweden is excluded) or less signiﬁcant (10%) if the United States are excluded.
Finally, we have added a dummy variable to capture the eﬀect of EMU. Our sample
comprises many countries that intended to enter EMU and this may have aﬀected their ﬁscal
policies as absence of a so-called excessive deﬁcit was an entry condition for EMU. So for the
member states of the European Union the dummy EMU is one starting from year X onwards,
while for the other countries and before year X the dummy is zero. We have experimented
with various values for X., starting with 1991 (in which the Maastricht Treaty was signed).
Only when X was 1996 its coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant in the regression for the budget deﬁcit, both
for the full sample and for the variant in which the countries with an opt-out are considered
not to be an EU-country.12 This only marginally aﬀects the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient for
ES (not shown).
5 Concluding comments
This paper extends the literature in a number of ways. In this paper we use data for central
government since the theoretical notions that underly the estimates clearly refer to central
government. Furthermore, we extend previous research in three other directions. First, we
examine other aspects of fragmentation, including political fragmentation as the ideological
coherence of a cabinet may matter for ﬁscal policy outcomes as well (see also Franzese (1998)).
11In case of the United Kingdom, after the ﬁrst elections in 1974, both the Conservatives and Labour did
not obtain a majority in the Lower House. Labour formed a government, since they had the highest number of
seats. After the second elections that year, Labour did obtain a majority in the Lower House. Since the Wilson
minority cabinet governed for 7 months, a minority government is recorded for that year. As far as the United
States are concerned, many of the Republican presidents faced a largely Democratic House of Representatives.
In these instances, the governments are recorded as being minority governments.
12This result is brodly in line with the ﬁndings of De Haan & Sturm (2000).
15Second, we examine government’s position vis-` a-vis parliament as this may also aﬀect ﬁscal
policy outcomes. Finally, we oﬀer a careful sensitivity analysis to check for the robustness of
our ﬁndings.
Our results for the budget deﬁcit indicate that:
• As far as size fragmentation is concerned, the impact of the number of ministers is
stronger and more robust than the eﬀective number of parties in government. In the
1970s the impact of the number of parties is negligible.
• As far as the relation to parliament is concerned, the most robust inﬂuence is exerted
through the eﬀective number of parties in parliament. The percentage of excess seats
in parliament mainly plays a role in the seventies, and it’s eﬀect is somewhat sensitive
to the inclusion of some countries in the sample.
• Political fragmentation does not seem to inﬂuence either revenues or expenditures, leav-
ing the deﬁcit unaﬀected as well. There is some evidence for an impact of maximum
distance of political complexion within a coalition.
• We ﬁnd evidence that during the 1970s right-wing governments tended to be ﬁscally
more responsible than left-wing governments.
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18A Data appendix
Variable: Description: Source:
ENPG eﬀective number of parties in
government
own calculations, data from Wold-
endorp, Keman, & Budge (1993)
and updates.
NSM number of spending ministries ibid.
ES excess seats of coalition in
parliament
Mackie & Rose (1982) and updates
thereof.
ENPP eﬀective number of parties in
parliament
ibid.
ICG ideology of government Dodd (1975), Browne, Gleiber, &
Mashoba (1984), Castles & Mair
(1984), Laver & Budge (1992),
Laver & Hunt (1992), Laver &
Schoﬁeld (1990), and Huber & In-
glehart (1995).
CPG ideology of government Woldendorp, Keman, & Budge
(1993) and updates.
PFRAP political fragmentation of par-
liament
ibid.
PFRAG political fragmentation of gov-
ernment
ibid.
MDPC max. ideological diﬀerence in
government
ibid.
DEF budget deﬁcit consolidated
central government (/GDP)
IMF, Government Financial Statis-
tics, various issues.
OUTL expenditure consolidated cen-
tral government (/GDP)
ibid.
INC reveneus consolidated central
government (/GDP)
ibid.
DRB interest payment consolidated
central government (/GDP)
ibid.
GROWTH growth rate of real GDP OECD Economic Outlook (1999).
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